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L DUE PROCESS MANDATES A RETRIAL WHERE THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FAILED To INCLUDE ALL NECESSARY 
ELEMENTS OF INJURY To A CHILD AND THE TRIAL 
COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY CORRECT THE ERROR. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Instructing the fury. 
R The Trial Court's Analysis of the Initial 
Instructions as "Lesser-Included Qffenses" was 
Erroneous and was Imvroverlv Avvlied. 
C. Sending the fury Back/or Second 
Deliberations with New Instructions Was Not 
Harmless. 
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submitting Count IV as felony in;ury to a child. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING SELLERS FOR MINIMUM FIXED TERMS 
INSTEAD OF THE MEDIAN RECOMMENDED SENTENCE OR 
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V. THE MULTIPLE ERRORS IN JURY SELECTION VIOLATED 
SELLER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
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is 
of bodily 
a counts 
§ 18-501 ( l ), with an enhancement of the final count 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-2520R R.342-44. was 
convicted on September 11, 2014 and sentenced on October 24, 2014. R.342-44, 429-33 On 
Counts I, II, and VI, vvas sentenced to a fixed term of five years and five years 
indeterminate. R.429-33; THI: 1859-61. On Count III, which the trial court entered conviction as 
a 
enhancement, the trial court sentenced Sellers to a ten-year fixed term and fifteen years 
indeterminate. Id. All of these sentences were ordered to run concurrent. Id. A total fine 
$4,000, court costs of $1,039.50, and reimbursement for the cost of the defense expert was 
ordered. Id. Sellers filed a timely notice of appeal on November 13, 2014. R.455-59. 
Statement ofthe Facts 
Background 
Cody Sellers ("Sellers") met Amanda Baret ("Baret") in the summer of 2011. TUI: I 338-
39. Baret and Sellers moved in together in Baret's apartment in Pocatello in late August/early 
September of 2011. TIII: 1342-43. Baret's one and a half year old daughter, N.T., lived with 
Baret. TIII:1345. In October/November of 2011, the three moved into Sellers' home in Big Sky, 
1 For the sake of clarity, references to record are designated with "R." followed by page numbers. References to the 
trial transcript are referred to by "T" followed by transcript volume, and references to the preliminary hearing 
transcript are referred to with the abbreviation "PH." 
IV 
1346-
was   at 26 R.18; 
THI: 1334-35. N.T. was in Primary Children's Hospital for four months after bilih due to medical 
conditions associated with her prematurity, including retinopathy of prematurity and "grade-
intraventricular hemorrhage on both sides" of the brain. TI:457, TIII: 1334-36. N.T. also 
a large portion of her bowel and her colon removed. Initially upon coming 
home to Baret's residence from the hospital after her birth, N.T. had an ostomy bag. TIII:1337. 
N.T. continued to suffer digestive issues after removal of the ostomy bag due to her "short 
"Tl:465; TII:700-01. 
N.T. experienced some developmental delay. TII:946-53. In the spring of 2012, N.T. was 
just beginning to walk and talk. TII:648-50; TUI: 1365-66. N.T. had an infant/toddler therapist 
who worked frequently with her to help with developmental concerns. TIII:1358-59. The State's 
medical experts, Dr. Campbell and Dr. McPherson, and N.T.'s treating pediatrician, Dr. Hardin, 
testified that both the retinopathy of prematurity and the intraventricular bleed were resolved 
prior to spring of 2012. TI:463; Tll:946, 972-73, 1120. 
According to Baret, in February of2012 she began to observe changes in N.T.'s 
behavior. THI: 1357. Specifically, N.T. appeared to be more and had less an appetite. 
1362. and Torres observed onN.T. 
V 
N 
THI: on 
at to come 
something was N.T as '·she look[ ed] dead. TIII: 1363. Sellers indicated at that time 
. had fallen asleeping and landed on her TI:467-68, 593; TTII:1367. 
When Baret arrived at the Big Sky home, N.T. was lucid but "tired and throwing up a lot." Id 
Baret and N.T. to the Pocatello Children's Clinic ,vhere she saw Dr. Murdoch. 
TI:580-83. TIU: l Dr. Murdoch ordered a CT and blood work. TI:592-94; TIil: 1368. Dr. 
Murdoch bruising and made a note of concern regarding abuse. TI:586-91, 594-97. 
N.T. was taken to PortneufMedical Center for the CT which came back normal. TIII:1368. 
Torres met the parties at the hospital and N.T. "was acting normal. She was giggling. She was 
walking." TlI:670. It was later learned that the March 22, 2012 CT was in fact not normal and 
the radiologist and doctor missed a subdural hematoma on N.T.'s brain. TIII:1510-11. 
After the March 22, 2012 episode, Sellers' mother suggested that Sellers take video of the 
episodes. TTIII:1380-81. Baret reported that after March 22, 2012, N.T. continued to "thr[o]w up 
a lot" but "would still play and be happy." TIII:1369. On April 3, 2012, N.T. had "another one 
her episodes" while Baret was at work. T[:468; TIII: 1371. Sellers was home with N.T. at the 
time and video recorded N.T. on his cell phone. TIII:1371, 1403; Ex.I. N.T. was "screaming" in 
a way Baret described, "I have never heard that scream come out ofmy child, ever." TIII:1 
Again, Baret and Sellers took N.T. to the Pocatello Children's Clinic. TIII:1371-72. N.T. was 
seen by Dr. Mcinturff~ scheduled an for April 5, 2012, to see ifN.T. had any 
VI 
not 
Dr. Mclnturff testified did not observe "any bruises or on her" 
and she was a little bit behind in her gross 
motor skills. TII:781. Dr. Mcinturff reviewed the notes from the March 2012 visit but "was 
more worried that she had something going on with her abdominal and GI tract" given N.T.'s 
history. TII:782-83. Dr. Mcinturff did not believe the episodes described by Sellers and Baret 
,vere TII:788-92.According to April 3, was still vomiting and 
but did not have any additional "episodes" for "quite some time." THI: 1376. 
Torres testified that on April 6, 2012, N.T. became ill and vomited while in his care at his 
birthday party with no display of . TII:671 697-99. N.T. was seen 
Dr. Brian Fulks on April 9, 2012, at the Pocatello Children's Clinic. TII:921-40. Baret took N.T. 
into the clinic due to the vomiting and diarrhea. TII:926. Dr. Fulks' general exam was 
"unremarkable" but he was concerned about hydration and potential bacterial or viral illness. Id. 
Dr. Fulks spoke to intestinal specialists at Primary Children's Medical Center. TU:928. Dr. Fulks 
did not follow-up on the concerns from the previous visits, although he testified that head trauma 
can cause ·'nausea and vomiting" but "[i]t usually does not cause diarrhea. TH:934. 
N.T. was seen by her primary pediatrician, Dr. Creighton Hardin of the Pocatello 
Children's Clinic, on April 12, 2012 for her nur,_u,, well-child check. TII:953-56. Dr. Hardin 
began treating at three months and was until October of 2012. 
Vil 
Dr. 
up 
that on 
forN.T. 
notes 
12, "[t]or [N.T.] ... , exam was normal." Id. 
approximately one Baret and Sellers went to Las 
Vegas, Nevada in mid-April and Torres did not witness any episodes during that time, nor at any 
time vvhile was in his care in the spring of 2012. TII:675, 735. On April 30, 2012, 
N.T. had another episode while in Sellers's care 
phone. TIII: 1404; State's 
he video recorded part of the episode using 
According to Baret, on May 2, 2012, N.T. had two episodes in the morning while Baret 
\Vas present. TI II: 13 79. Sellers took video of the second episode. Ex. I. Baret scheduled an 
appointment with N.T.'s regular pediatrician, Dr. Hardin, at the Pocatello Children's Clinic but 
later cancelled the appointment due her feeling that the doctor was not taking her concerns 
seriously. TIII: 1379. Dr. Hardin testified that Baret contacted the clinic and provided him a video 
ofN.T. TII:957. According to Dr. Hardin, the video showed N.T. "on her back on the floor 
rolling back and forth. [ think I made a mention that she ·wasn't arching. There were no seizure-
like activities. It could be a temper tantrum, or it could be that she was just uncomfortable." Id. 
Dr. Hardin told Baret that it may be "reflux" and suggested to continue videoing. Tll:958. 
3, 2012, Torres had custody ofN.T. whiile he was in the process of moving to a 
new appartment. TH:677, 691. Two witnesses present during the day observed N.T.'s behavior: 
VIII 
N 
to 12, 
Baret described a game with she would "hold [N.T.] over 
and I would drop her " Id. On this particular Baret 
THI: 1384. Baret left for work at that point, leaving Sellers to care 
N.T. by playing this 
N.T. Id.; THI:1404. At 
approximately 11 :00 am, Sellers texted Baret at "saying [N.T.] was having another 
crib, 
episode, but it looked different." THI: 1 State's Ex. (Text Message Log). Sellers sent Baret a 
TIH:1384: State's Ex.3 (l l:Olam Video). In 
approximately twenty (20) seconds each over a 
Sellers four videos of 
of approximately twenty minutes. State's 
Ex.3-6. Medical viewed the videos and testified that it appeared that N.T.'s physical 
condition deteriorated over the course of the 20 TI:473; TU:1160. 
Baret contacted Dr. Hardin who instructed her to bring to the clinic. TII:959. Baret 
and Sellers took her to the clinic at approximately 11: am. THI: 1385. When Baret arrived home, 
N.T. was "alternating between these moments where she would just be laying there to stiffening 
up and making these God-awful sounds." TUI: 1386. Dr. Hardin observed N.T. for less than five 
minutes before instructing them to take N.T. to Portneufs emergency room. TII:680; TUI: 1387. 
Dr. Hardin testified that N.T. "definitely had an abnormal neurologic exam[,]" "was quite 
stiffI,]" and \Vas "encephalopathic." TH:960. Dr. Hardin also testified that N.T. "had normal air 
exchange" at the time N.T. was brought in. TII:965. 
to s 
TI!I:1388. Torres Sellers traveled to Salt Lake City to be with N .T. Tll:681; 
TIH:1388. N.T.'s injuries \Vere N.T. had a diffuse subdural hemorrhage, TI:478; 
retinoschisis, bilateral retinal hemorrhaging, TI:476. The State's medical expert, Dr. 
CampbelL opined that as a result of the injuries, N.T.'s brain atrophied and experienced brain 
shrinkage creating neurological disabilities. TI:488. N.T. was in PCMC for about a month 
before she was the May 4111 N.T. could not speak, 
walk, or feed herself TII:686, 1177. N.T. could stand with assistance and could not pick up 
objects. TII:687. She had to be fed through a tube. 1-52. See also TII:962-63. 
Investigation & lvf edical Evidence 
Pocatello Police Detectives arrived at PrimaryChildrens'. TI:610-12. They interviewed 
Baret, Sellers, Torres, and spoke to the treating physicians. TI:611-15. Sellers was interviewed at 
by Sergeant McClure and described Sellers demeanor as "indifferent." TI:614-15; Ex.41. Shortly 
after, the case was turned over to Power County detective Sprague. TI:620. During the course of 
Sprague's testimony at trial the State introduced two interviews Sprague conducted with Sellers, 
one on May 10, 2012 and the other on June 4, 2012. TH:836-63, 995-1059; State's Exs. 42, 43. 
Sprague's established that on March 22, April 3, April 30, and May 4, of 2012, 
Sellers' had custody ofN.T. while Baret was at work. TII:1002-04, 1061; State's Exs. 31, 32, 
Sprague had and phones 's 
X 
4, 4, 2012 at 11 
1-1 101 1, 
Campbell (PCMC) Dr 1071- Tlll: 1201-06. 
also called four doctors from the Pocatello Children's Clinic to testify regarding N .T. 's 
treatment TI:575-605 (Dr. Matthew Murdoch); TII:775-99 (Dr. Don Mcinturff); TH:91 
39 (Dr. Brian Fulks); TII:940-85; Tll:940-93 (Dr. Creighton Hardin). On cross-examination, 
Pocatello Clinic doctors a civil lawsuit was pending at the time of 
Sellers' trial against the doctors involved in N 's treatment. TII:987. 
Dr. Campbell treated after her arrival at PCMC. TI:450. The PCMC treating team 
performed tests to rule out other potential, non-abuse related causes of the injuries. TI:522-23; 
see also TII: 1168. Dr. Campbell testified that the subdural hemorrhage was "what we usually see 
in shaking injuries." TI:480. Further, Dr. Campbell testified that the injuries were indicative of 
an immediate onset of symptoms and not injuries from a "short fall." TI:483, 488. Dr. Campbell 
also testified generally regarding abusive head trauma. TI:404-50. 
The State called Dr. McPherson as an expert in child abuse pediatrics and he testified 
regarding abuse injuries in children, including abusive head trauma. TII: 1071-1200; TIII: 1201-
06. McPherson opined that with symptoms like "bleeding on the brain, severe bleeding in the 
eyes, and brain swelling ... there would be little, if any, delay from the time of the event to 
\vhen" the symptoms appeared. Tm: 1105, 1175. Dr. McPherson testified that retinal 
that 
N.T. 
4, 20 l 4 episode, including videos taken by 
" TI: 1112- 3. 
care as a 
TH: 1118. He testified that he "did 
be predisposed to injuries 
sustained or identified on or after March 22nd[.]" TII:11 Dr. McPherson opined 
a reasonable degree of medical certainty" the injuries sustained by N.T. were 
consistentvvith abusive events. Tll:1133-34, 1143; TIII: 1540-41. 
The defense called Dr. Janice Ophoven as their medical TIII:1222-1302. She 
"performed an independent forensic analysis of the case of [N.T.]" TUI: 1227. Dr. Ophoven 
opined that N.T.'s injuries could have resulted from increased pressure due to the scarring from 
the ventricular bleeding shortly after N.T.'s birth and that N.T.'s neurological issues were 
"ongoing over a course of months." TIU: 1231 She that there was "no evidence to 
support the opinion that the child has suffered a traumatic brain injury that was inflicted" on the 
date of symptomology. THI: 1247. Dr. Ophoven questioned the practice of diagnosing abusive 
head trauma in medical circumstances where other known potential causes of injuries have been 
diagnostically eliminated, but there is no outward or other indication of trauma other than the 
injuries themselves. TIII: 1249, 1292-93. 
On rebuttal, Dr. McPherson testified that ifN.T. had a spontaneous bleed of the kind 
described by Dr. Ophoven, "[N.T.] would be the very first case report all of [reported] history 
we following neonates or premature babies this problem." Tm: 1507. 
XII 
counts to a 
§ 18-1 with an Idaho § 1 R.11-1 
of Probable Cause supporting the Complaint alleged that on four different dates 
March through May 4, 2014, Sellers willfully inflicted injury on N .T. R.18-20. The 
complaint alleged in Count IV that Sellers failed to seek medical attention on May 4th. R.19-20. 
Count V was charged \Vith an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury upon N.T. on May 
4, 2012. R.14. The enhancement charged that N.T. suffered "subdural hemorrhages and/or 
bilateral hemorrhages and/or bilateral retinoschisis[.]" Id. 
The case was before the Honorable Paul Laggis but defense counsel filed a Motion to 
Disqualify and it was reassigned to the Honorable R. Todd Garbett on December 4, 2013. R.63-
64, 69. However, the case was ultimately heard by the Honorable Stephen S. Dunn. A 
preliminary hearing was held on January 27, 2014. R.101-03. Sellers was bound over on all five 
counts of felony injury to a child and the enhancement. Id. On February 13, 2014, Sellers was 
arraigned and pied "not guilty" to all of the charges. R.113-15. 
On April l, 2014, Sellers filed a "Motion to Dismiss Count V, Enhancement," R. 125-27; 
and a "Motion to Dismiss Count JV or V," based on double jeopardy issues. R.128-30. These 
motions were heard on April 10, 2014. R.136; TI: 1-30. The trial court denied both motions by 
written order on April 23, 2014. R.176. 
On September 2, 2014, the trial court addressed the following 
for sequestration, TI:47-52 (motion denied); defense's objection to the 
xm 
defense's motion 
of jury 
term 
to prohibit use of the terminology "abusive head "Tl:73-76 (motion 
motion missing polygraph (motion 
and to exclude the post-polygraph interview recording, TI:83-88 (motion denied); 
motion to exclude the State's demonstrative videos that were disclosed late, Tl:88-97 
(motion granted); defense's motion in limine regarding cumulative testimony, TI:97-98 (issue 
motion to exclude evidence regarding the Child Protection case and custody 
TI:98-102, 105 (granted to limited and motion to bifurcate the 
enhancement TI: I 02-106 (granted as to the instructions but denied as to bifurcating the evidence 
for enhancement). The trial court also reviewed the with counsel on the day 
prior to trial after hearing final pretrial motions. Tl: 109-12. 
The jury trial was held from September 3-5 and 8-11 of 2014 in the Sixth District Court, 
Power County, before the Honorable Stephen S. Dunn. See R.348-55. Jury selection took most of 
the first day of trial. TI: 120-349. The State called a total of fourteen (14) witnesses. R.351. The 
evidence adduced through these witnesses tended to show that on four dates in spring of 2012, 
Sellers was providing care for the minor child, N.T., and that N.T. evidenced neurological 
symptoms consistent with abusive trauma. See, e.g., TH: l 1. The defense called four 
R.351. The defense case tended to that was not character to 
XIV 
On the sixth day of the the jury was post-proof instructions. TIII: 1564-75. The 
State did not to 1559. Defense objected to the lack 
"willful'' instruction on each element instruction and to the use of the standard "beyond a 
reasonable doubt instruction." TIU: 1559-60. The trial court previously determined that the 
instructions would be bifurcated; the jury would be given instructions regarding Counts I through 
V (instructions l l through 27), then if Sellers was on Count V, the jury would be 
given instructions on Part II, the great bodily injury enhancement (instructions 28 and 29). 
TI: I 05. During deliberations, the jury sent back a question: "Do we look at each charge without 
considering what happened with any other charge? Or we look at them at all as interrelated?" 
TIII: 1636. Thereafter, the jury returned an initial guilty verdict on Counts I through V. 
TIII: 1649-50. The trial court instructed the jury as to Part II, the enhancement. TIII: 1650-52. 
While the jury was deliberating Part II, defense counsel notified the trial court regarding errors in 
the instructions. Tm: 1653-54. Defense counsel argued that it would be inappropriate to reopen 
the verdict and reinstruct the jury because the charged instructions were for "misdemeanor" 
injury to a child and thus jeopardy had attached when the verdict was put on record. Id. 
charging 
did not. TIII:1661-
The trial court the jury was "inconsistently" instructed 
instruction number 2 included the proper elements while instructions 1 
62. trial court that the jury had not been it be appropriate to 
xv 
came to II 
TIU: l 670. That verdict was not THI: 1670-72. trial court then provided 
21 and the to return following 
. THI:1673-75. The parties and the trial court continued to discuss the instructions while the 
deliberated the next day. TIH: 1676-97. The argued that the reinstruction was proper 
v. Hickman, a 2008 Idaho Supreme Court decision involving a missing element 
THI: 1677-78. Defense counsel to argue that the acquiesced in the instructions 
and that jeopardy attached to the "misdemeanor" convictions. TIII:1679-83. 
The trial court found that looking at ICJI 1 "a reasonable argument could be made 
the misdemeanor to a child standard instruction. Tm: 1685. As to ICJI 1244, 
"(t]here's no question that that is specifically a felony injury to child instruction." TIII:686-87. 
The trial court went on to compare the circumstance to that in State v. Young, a 2001 case, where 
the first six elements of felony injury to a were given, thereafter special circumstance 
instruction. TIII:1687-88. The trial court found that was ··exactly what we did here." Id. 
The trial court noted that the enhancement instruction number 28 previously submitted to 
the jury was also error. TIU: 1691-93. Thereafter, jury submitted a question regarding the 
"special instruction. THI: 1698-99. trial court instructed the jury to, "Please 
refer to the instruction given with this verdict form." THI: l 701. After further deliberations, the 
jury submitted another inquiry whether they needed to continue deliberating if they had 
xvr 
IIL THI: 1710-13. The trial court re-instructed the 
the modified 28 instruction. TIII:1715. The 
as to Count V. TIII:1716-17. 
Post-Trial 
Sellers filed a Motion for Trial and Motion for These motions were heard 
on October 2014, the same day as sentencing. TIII: l 861; R.429. Motion 
for Trial argued Sellers should be granted a new trial (l) Juror 20 should have 
excused for cause; (2) cumulative testimony; (3) prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the second 
deliberations issue; and (5) cumulative error. R.359-63. The Motion for Acquittal argued 
insufficient evidence as to Counts I, II, and III. Both of motions were denied. R.434-54. 
On Counts I, IL and VL Sellers was sentenced to a fixed term of five years and five years 
indeterminate. TIII: 1859-61. On Count IIL which the trial court entered conviction as a 
misdemeanor, Sellers was sentenced to one year. Id. Finally, on Count V and the enhancement, 
the trial court sentenced Sellers to a fixed term and fifteen years indeterminate. Id. All 
of these sentences were ordered to run concurrent. Id. A total fine of $4,000, court costs of 
$1,054.50, and reimbursement for the cost of the defense expert was also ordered. Id. 
After sentencing, Sellers filed a Rule 35 Motion arguing that the sentence was '·unduly 
harsh or "R.478-79. motion was denied. R.480-8 l. 
XVII 
a 
to 
attempting to correct the instructions. 
and 
result was consideration of 
''°"'"-u".uuv, offenses where none were properly 
a new trial. 
a confused . Sellers should 
Second, Sellers argues that the misdemeanor conviction by the trial on Count III 
was not appropriately before the jury, nor were all the elements in Idaho Code § 18-150 l (2) 
. This conviction should be vacated. 
Third, Sellers argues that the trial court en-ed in allowing Counts IV and V to be tried 
separately as they were part of a single criminal '-IJ•.,v,~ .... 
jeopardy protections. The convictions should merge 
violating constitutional double 
Sellers' sentence for one of the offenses 
vacated. Fourth, Sellers argues that the trial court improperly denied motions for cause to remove 
biased jurors. The result was that Sellers lost a peremptory challenge and an actual biased juror 
sat on the jury. 
Fifth, Sellers asks the Court to correct the illegal sentencing issues raised as to Counts III, 
IV, and V. Sellers also argues that the sentences for the convictions were unduly harsh given the 
circumstances. asks the Court to reduce his sentences. 
not all of the errors were prejudicial, combined, errors 
should receive a new trial. 
1 
Sellers argues that even if 
Sellers due process and 
instructions to jury in the round of deliberations failed to include 
element of "under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death" 
of felony injury to a child under Idaho Code § 18-1501 (1 ). R.321-
26, 334-35 (Instructions l 6-2 L & 27). The jury found Sellers guilty based upon those 
instructions. trial court dealt with the initial jury determination as "misdemeanor" 
convictions under Idaho Code § l 8-150 l (2) throughout the remainder the trial. The trial court 
instructed the jury in the "corrected" instructions that it had already found Sellers guilty of 
Counts I through V when in fact no finding had been made on the necessary "circumstances or 
conditions" element in the initial verdict. R.327, 336-37 (Instructions 2 I A, 28, 28 Modified). 
In total, the jury deliberated four separate verdicts total: (1) Count I through V without all 
of the felony elements; (2) the Part II bodily injury enhancement with an incorrect instruction; 
(3) ,vhether "special circumstances" applied to Counts I through V; and (4) the Part TT 
enhancement with a corrected instruction. R.352-54. This combination of events appears to be 
unique in Idaho, raising new issues of!a\v, procedure, and error. See TIii: 1765. 
By not including the circumstances/conditions element required for felony injury to a 
child ("under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death") in the 
first set of and not explaining this error to jury, the court placed jury in 
2 
were on an 
to confusion surrounding the jury instructions, verdicts and 
As the jury instructions and forms Sellers' due rights 
resulted in reversible error. 
These issues were preserved, in part, on record after the initial verdict was rendered, 
in Sellers' Motion for a New Trial, R.362; TIII: 1653-98; and even if they were not preserved, 
are so essential to affording due process that qualify as fundamental error necessitating 
See State v. Perry, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (Idaho I 0). 
Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which this Court 
free review. State v. Gleason, 844 P .2d 69 l, 694 (Idaho 1992). In reviewing jury 
instructions for error, this Court looks to whether "the instructions, as a whole, fairly and 
adequately present the issues and state the law." State v. Sheahan, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (Idaho 2003). 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Instructing the Jwy. 
The Idaho Supreme Court holds that a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to 
effect to the requirement that the State prove every element of an offense. State Anderson, 
170 P.3d 886, 891-92 (Idaho 2007). Indeed, "[j]ury instructions must inform the jury as 
to the elements of the crime charged." State v. 
There is no doubt that the felony injury to a child jury instructions put to the jury during 
deliberations \vere erroneous. TIU: 1660 (trial court: "clearly the are 
3 
itto 
[Defense counsel]: The instructions that were submitted to the jury and that the 
[jury] has rendered a verdict on actually only end up convicting Mr. Sellers of 
misdemeanors. The pattern [ ljury instruction for injury to child with a felony, 
I note there's an element is not included on the instructions on which the 
jury has deliberated. 
[Trial Court]. That's more than a technicality. 
[Defense Counsel]: That is. 
[Trial Court]: So what is your point relative to that? 
[Defense Counsel]: Well, the instructions that have been submitted track Jury 
Instruction 1243, which is an injury to child. For it to be a felony injury to 
child, there is a necessity that 1244, that each of these convictions must include 
"the above occurred under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great 
bodily harm or death to the child." So I believe at this point jeopardy is 
attached and the defendant stands convicted of five misdemeanor counts. 
THI: 1653-54. More correctly stated, the initial instructions stated the elements for injury to a 
child without the distinguishing element that determines if the conduct was felonious or a 
misdemeanor. elements instructions 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Count I, charging Injury to Child, 
the state must prove each of the following: 
l. On or about March 2012; 
2. the State of Idaho; 
3. the Defendant, Cody Sellers; 
4. willfully inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on N.T.; and 
5. was 18 years of age. 
4 
The charging instruction (Instruction 2) listed five counts of felony injury to a child. 
difference in bet\veen a felony and a misdemeanor are: 
circumstances or conditions to produce great bodily harm or death" for the felony; 
circumstances or conditions than those likely to produce great bodily harm or 
death" for the misdemeanor. Idaho Code § I 8-1501 ( 1 )-(2) ( emphasis added); cf R.11-15 
(Complaint). Also, a felony conviction for a in a situation endangering the child, 
the State must prove that such person or health endangered" while a misdemeanor requires 
that such person or health "may be endangered." Id. 
If a felony is charged, the wording of the statute precludes guilt under subsection (2), if 
subsection (1) exists. For the jury to convict Sellers of five misdemeanor counts of injury to a 
child, it required a specific finding that the injuries occurred "under circumstances or conditions 
other than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death." Id. (emphasis added). The felony 
portion of the statute is mutually exclusive of the misdemeanor. Conduct falls either in the felony 
category or the misdemeanor category but not both because the distinguishing element is the 
"circumstances/condition" element that is either present, in which case it is a felony, or absent, in 
which case it is a misdemeanor. It cannot be both. In initial deliberations, found Sellers 
guilty of injury to a child without any language at all in the instructions regarding the "conditions 
5 
any 
was then sent out to consider the actual bodily injury enhancement 
State in Part II, as to V. THI: 1650-52. Upon further the next day, 
trial court also noticed that the Idaho Code § l 9-2520B enhancement instruction, number 28, was 
incorrect and modified that instruction. TUI: 1694-95; R.336-37. The first number 28 instruction 
conflated the "under circumstances" element required for a felony conviction with the bodily 
injury enhancement requirements, thus confusing the jury even more. Id. 
Rather than declare a mistrial, the trial court determined that the proper remedy was to re-
instruct the jury correctly on both Part I and Part II of the instructions. TUI: 1663-65. The trial 
court justified this procedure by case lavv utilizing ICJI instructions 1243 and 1244 in State v. 
Young. 64 P.3d 296 (Idaho 2002). TIII: 1688. As described below, the incorrect analysis and 
application of State v. Young only served to exacerbate the confusion to the jury caused by the 
erroneous initial instructions. The confusion was particularly prejudicial because the jury had 
repeatedly been instructed that they had already found Sellers guilty. 1 
B. The Trial Court's Analysis o(the Initial Instructions as ''Lesser-Included Offenses" 
was Erroneous and was Improperly Applied. 
At trial, Sellers' counsel argued that the initial verdict '·under 
likely" element equated to misdemeanor convictions. TIII:1653-54. The trial court accepted this 
1 The jury was never instructed to disregard its prior determination of "guilt" or to start 
deliberations a new. 
6 
so IL 
"lesser-included was erroneous. To 
See 
(trial court's analysis invited error in error). 
The ICJI instructions as suggested in State v. do contemplate utilizing a "special 
circumstance'' instruction for the "under circumstances" element required for a felony injury a 
child conviction. 64 P.3d at But, current since l 0 
(Young was decided in 2002), prior to Sellers' 
follows: 
does not. The current version reads as 
1244 INJURY TO CHILDREN 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Injury to a Child, the state 
must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about [date] 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant [name] 
[[4. [wilfully caused or permitted [name of child] to suffer,] [or] [wilfully inflicted 
on [name of child] unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering,] and 
[or] 
5. [name of child] was 18 years of age.] 
[ 4. had the care or custody of [ name of child] 
5. who was a child under 18 years of age, and 
7. the above occurred under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great 
or death to [ name of child]] 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
[The word "willfully" means acting or failing to act where a reasonable 
person would know the act or failure to act is likely to result in injury or harm or 
is likely to endanger the person, health, or well-being of the child.] 
visited 2/7/2016). That means the trial court did not use presumptively correct ICJI 
instruction. State v. Hopper, 129 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005). 
The standardized jury instruction for "injury to a child" appears in ICJI 1243 and does 
not include expressly the "under circumstances or conditions other than" element "1243 Injury 
'"",_,'1,,,. that does not mean by default that Instruction 1243 is a proper misdemeanor injury to 
a child instruction pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-1501 (2).2 ICJI 1243 is an insufficient instruction 
2 Although the trial court relied on State v. Young to demonstrate that the "special circumstance" 
procedure was correct, this case actually suggests that Instruction 1243 is not sufficient, on its 
own, to be a misdemeanor instruction. 64 P.3d at 299. In Young, instructions 1243 and 1244 
were given for the felony count but the trial court refused to instruct the jury on a lesser-included 
misdemeanor offense. Id. at 300-01. Where the trial court in Young refused to instruct on the 
misdemeanor offense, ICJJ 1243 by itself cannot be the proper misdemeanor injury to a child 
instruction. 
8 
or IS 
at issue in this case and absent from the ICJI instruction. Id. 
that ICJI 1 is a proper misdemeanor to a child instruction, 
court in implementing this analysis with the jury. The trial court did not provide a 
uPr,,.,wr form instructing the jury as to the lesser-included option. R.327-28 (Verdict I), 340-41 
(Verdict ll). Idaho has adopted the '·acquittal-first rule" requiring that the jury consider the 
crrP•,tPr offense before the lesser. Idaho Code § l v. 304 P.3d 282 
(Idaho 2013). This rule states that the district court ·'shall instruct the jury that it may not 
consider the lesser included offense unless it has first considered of the offenses. 
Idaho Code§ 19-2132(c). Here, the jury wasn't even aware they were considering 
included" during the first deliberations, let alone that the trial court entered a conviction 
on Count III after their final verdict acquitted Sellers of the count 
Finally, assuming that the first set of instructions were properly "misdemeanors," the 
instruction pertaining to Count IV, placing N.T. in a situation where health was endangered, 
was erroneous as it did not include the "may be" language in Idaho Code § 18-1501 (2). 
Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in guiding the trial court to this erroneous 
"misdemeanor" conclusion. Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant must show "that 
counsel's performance was deficient and the deficiency prejudiced the case." Dunlap v. State, 
9 
lJ 
1S 
the outcome 
different. trial counsel's analysis the first verdict was not objectively reasonable 
the first did not include an element required for a misdemeanor 
conviction allowed the trial court to instruct the jury that they had already found 
Sellers guilty no such finding had been made. Trial counsel should have been fully aware 
of the elements required, particularly as he at one point considered submitting lesser-included 
to THI: 1679 This deficient performance resulted in prejudice where the trial 
court entered a 
Section IL 
conviction on Count HI based in part upon defense error. 
Furthermore, the error was fundamental error prejudicially effecting Sellers constitutional 
rights. See Perry, 245 P.3d at 978. It is fundamental to a jury trial that the State be required to 
prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury can find the 
defendant guilty of offense. See Anderson, 170 P.3d at 891. Relieving the State of that 
burden and then instructing the jury that they had already found Sellers guilty of the charged 
offenses violated fundamental due process rights. 
Sending the Jwy Back for Second Deliberations with New Instructions Was Not 
10 
California, 386 (1967)). 
raised of the the Court re-
instructed the jury with the addition a instruction on the circumstances under which 
the alleged crimes took place, and sent them back for new deliberations. Tlll: 1670-72. The trial 
court actually provided the jury corrected instructions after the jury reached a verdict on Part 
did not allO\v the first Part II verdict to recorded. TIII: 1713; see also TI: 101 
(trial court ruled the enhancement would be bifurcated in the instructions). The trial court told 
and the verdict which I've been told you've rendered as to a supplement[al] verdict. .. So for 
purposes-at this moment I need you to set aside consideration of the supplemental verdict. Id. 
Upon reinstruction, the jury found Sellers guilty of four of the five counts of injury of a 
child as felonies (Counts I, II, IV, and V). R.342-43. The jury also found Sellers guilty of the 
enhancement in Part IL R.344. The trial court entered a conviction for Count III against Sellers 
as a misdemeanor pursuant to the first verdict. R. 
3 Cf State v. Nunez, 981 P.2d 738, 744-46 (Idaho 1999) (remanded for resentencing as a 
misdemeanor where the jury a misdemeanor conviction, 
not a felony conviction). 
11 
a correct 
the trial court had erroneously instructed the jury that it had found Sellers 
Code§ I 9-2132(c). The misstatements in the initial instructions and 
re-instruction procedure "were apt to confuse or mislead the jury" as to \Vhat the State was 
actually required to prove. Young, 64 P3d at 299. In fact, during the second deliberations, the 
sent back a question to the trial court: 
Does the statement, quote, "Such offense occurred under circumstances or 
conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death to the child, unquote, 
mean what seem to have occurred did produce-underlined-did produce 
great bodily harm or death, or in any similar circumstance could that act-
underlined-potentially produce great bodily harm or death. 
TJII: 1698-99. This question pertained specifically to the additional instruction submitted to the 
jury for the second deliberations, Instruction No. 21A, which read: 
Now that you have found the Defendant guilty of Injury to Child in Counts I 
through V, you must next consider whether the state has proven that such 
offense occurred under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great 
bodily harm or death to the child. You must indicate on the verdict form 
whether or not this has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
R.327. The question shows that the jury was unsure as to how to apply the new instruction to the 
element instructions previously given. By that point, the jury had also already considered the first 
enhancement instructions, 28 and 29. Those instructions stated "you must next consider whether 
the state has proven that such offense occurred under circumstances or conditions likely to 
produce great bodily injury to the child," which the trial court after the jury was 
12 
II. 
bifurcated instructions. TI: IOL 
with this verdict THI:1700-01; R .. 
jury 
thereby entirely defeating the purpose of the 
These substantial errors in the instructions and the instruction violated Sellers 
right to due process 
THE DISTRICT 
case should be remanded anew 
ERRED IN A MISDEMEANOR FOR III. 
Sellers argues that the district court erred entering a conviction on Count III after the 
jury acquitted Sellers of Count III as charged on the second verdict form. This issue was not 
preserved below and is therefore reviewed by this Court for fundamental error. See Perry, 245 
P .3d at 978-79. To the extent this error was invited by defense counsel, Sellers also argues that 
counsel was ineffective. 
While the jury was deliberating on the injury of a child counts a second time, counsel 
put arguments on the record regarding the validity of the initial verdict and the propriety of the 
procedure upon recognizing the error: 
[Trial Court]: Now let's say they come back a that says not guilty 
on all five counts. What we have are five misdemeanor convictions. On that I 
would readily agree with you, [defense counsel]. If they come back-
[Defense Counsel]: I think I agree 
13 
THI: 1693-94. On the day prior, defense counsel indicated that he did not intend for the lesser-
included misdemeanor instructions to actually submitted, he did not request such on the 
record, and he did not submit a lesser-included jury verdict form to that end. TIII: 1679. Thus, it 
was improper for the trial court to sua sponte determine that the lesser-included offenses were at 
issue without first determining if the lesser included offenses were supported by the evidence 
presented in the case. See State Lopez, 593 P.2d 1003, I 006 (Idaho 1979). 
To the extent this error was invited by defense counsel, Sellers argues that it was 
ineffective assistance of counseL See TIII: 1661-63. This Court evaluates claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, both under the Federal Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution article I, 
section 13, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court decision in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must show ''that counsel's performance was 
deficient and the deficiency prejudiced the case." Dunlap, 106 P.3d at 385. Counsel is deficient 
when "the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. 
Prejudice is shown where "but for the attorney's deficient performance" the outcome would have 
been different. Id. 
Here, defense counsel's acquiescence to the trial court's conclusion that a conviction 
according to the improper and inadequate instructions but an acquittal on the corrected 
instructions meant Sellers was therefore guilty of a misdemeanor, was objectively unreasonable. 
14 
it was to 
because "the testimony that we heard throughout the entire pertained to the 
"under or likely to produce great bodily harm or 
death." TIil: 1657. Finally, the lesser-included instructions 
put before the jury, as noted supra in section l(B). 
verdict form were not properly 
This Court has previously determined that trial courts do have '·authority to sua sponte 
on included offenses provided the such instructions was reasonable 
based on the evidence presented." State v. Rae, 84 P.3d 586, 589 (Idaho App. 2004). Here 
though, there was no analysis as to whether such instructions were appropriate given the 
evidence-the misdemeanor instructions were submitted to the jury solely in error and without 
an appropriate verdict form. The trial court also relied on Young in its conclusion that 
misdemeanor injury to a child is a lesser-included offense of felony injury to a child. The Young 
Court accepted this proposition without analysis but as noted supra in section I, the misdemeanor 
offense is not a true lesser-included offense of the felony as each crime requires proof of a 
different element. See State v. Marek, 736 P.2d l 314, 1319 (Idaho 1987). 
Sellers was prejudiced by the acquiescence defense counsel because the trial court 
ultimately entered a misdemeanor conviction and sentenced Sellers to the maximum penalty on 
Count III. This Court should vacate Sellers' misdemeanor conviction on Count III. 
Court 
V to be put separately before the jury 
counts merge as a single criminal 
m counts 
on both charges when both 
"constitutional protections against 
double jeopardy present[s] questions of law which [this Court] exercise[s] free revie\v." State v. 
Moad, 330 P.3d 400,404 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014). This issue was preserved in Sellers' Motion to 
Dismiss Count IV or V, filed prior to trial. R.128. 
In Counts IV and V of the Information, the State charged Sellers with two counts of 
felony injury of a child, both occurring on May 2012. R. 106. Count V alleged injuries to N 
occurring on May 4th, and Count IV alleged that Sellers failed to seek medical assistance for 
those injuries inflicted upon N.T. R.13-14. Prior to trial, Sellers moved the trial court to dismiss 
one of the counts, arguing that charging Sellers for two crimes out of the single criminal episode 
on May 4, 2012 violated the constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy. R.128; Tr: 1-27. The 
trial court denied Sellers' motion to dismiss, finding that the charges did not violate either federal 
or state double jeopardy protections. R.176-83. 
Pursuant to the U.S. Fifth Amendment and Idaho Constitution, article L section 13, no 
person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. These constitutional provisions afford 
protection against "a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal punishments for the 
same offense." v. 1HcKeeth, 38 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001). The district court 
16 
counts same same 
and the same injuries. It was therefore error to try both counts because doing so allows 
multiple same offense 
of the federal and state constitutions. 
A. Blockburger Test 
The United States Supreme Court a "statutory theory" to decide if a defendant's 
prosecution or conviction punishment for two violates double jeopardy. See 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). This theory provides: 
[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct 
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there have 
been two offenses or only one for double jeopardy purposes is whether each 
statutory provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. 
State v. Corbus, 256 P.3d 776, 779 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011) (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304). 
In other word, the federal examination is one of "strict elements[,]" looking "only to the statutory 
elements of the crimes. State v. Kinney, 291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (Idaho 2013). 
In the instant case, Sellers was not charged under "two distinct statutory provisions." 
Corbus, 256 P.3d at 779. Sellers was charged under the same code provision for felony injury to 
a thus are 
(1) Any person vvho, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great 
bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts 
mental or care or 
child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such 
(2) Any person circumstances or conditions other than those likely 
to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to 
suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or 
having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person 
or health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such child 
to be placed in such situation that its person or health may be endangered, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(5) As used in this section, "willfully" means acting or failing to act where a 
reasonable person would knmv the act or failure to act is likely to result in 
injury or harm or is likely to endanger the person, health, safety or well-being 
of the child. 
Idaho Code § 18-150 l. district court found that double jeopardy was not implicated under 
Blockburger where "the facts which give rise to each of the respective claims are different and 
the elements as they would be charged in the jury instructions are different R.178-79. 
There is no question that Count IV as charged alleged "the defendant willfully caused the 
child's person or health to be injured by the act of failing to obtain medical attention," TUI: 1568; 
while Count V as charged alleged the defendant "willfully inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or 
mental suffering on N.T." Id. But, in State v. Afojfat, the Idaho Court of Appeals applying the 
Blockburger test went further, stating "it is generally held that when a person commits multiple 
acts against the same victim during a single criminal episode and each act could independently 
support a conviction for the same offense, for the purposes of double jeopardy the 'offense' is 
typically the episode, not each individual act. 300 P.3d 61, 65 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013). ln that 
case, this Court evaluated whether Moffat was properly and attempted 
18 
The circumstances here are similar in that State charged Sellers with the "same 
in independent counts but these counts arose the same Given 
double jeopardy violation, this Court 
V and remand for resentencing. 
B. Idaho State Constitution 
vacate Sellers' conviction for either Count IV or 
Unlike the federal analysis, Idaho has adopted the ·'pleading approach" to examine 
whether a prosecution or conviction and violates state constitutional double jeopardy 
protection. "Under this pleading theory, a court must consider whether the terms of the charging 
document allege that both offenses arose the same factual circumstances such that one 
offense was the means by which the other was committed." State v. lvfoad, 330 P.3d 400, 404 
(Idaho Ct App. 2014) ( citation omitted). "This inquiry requires consideration of the 
circumstances of the conduct, and consideration of the intent and objective of the actor." State v. 
1viajor, 725 P.2d 115, I 19 (Idaho 1986) (internal citations omitted). "[I]f it appears that the 
double jeopardy bar may be implicated, the court must make a factual inquiry as to whether the 
crimes were parts of one continuing event or transaction." lvfoad, 330 P.3d at 450. "Whether a 
course of criminal conduct constitutes one offense or several depends upon 'whether or not the 
conduct constituted separate, distinct and independent crimes. Id. at 406 ( quoting Afajor, 725 
P.2d at 119). 
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to V 
12:01 on 2012. R.l 15. to that 
this time period, N suffered a traumatic brain injury resulting a rapid onset subdural 
hematoma, retinoschisis, and retinal hemorrhaging. TI:4 76-78; TII:l l 05. Over approximately 
twenty-three minutes, Sellers recorded multiple, short cell phone videos ofN.T., which were 
examined by the medical expert witnesses and law enforcement witness. State's Trial 1-6. 
The testimony elicited at the preliminary hearing and trial suggested that over the time period, 
N.T.'s physiological condition deteriorated. PH:11 5; TI:473. The evidence also showed that 
Sellers contacted Baret frequently during this timeframe to find out how she wanted to handle 
the situation. See State's Trial Ex.32. 
In finding that the charges did not violate Idaho double jeopardy protections, the district 
court found prior to trial that the pleading theory "does not lead to the conclusion that the two 
counts are the same crime" as "[i]t would be incongruent and inconsistent to conclude that the 
Defendant used his physical abuse of the child as a means to commit the crime of failing to seek 
medical assistance after the child was injured by said abuse. R.180. This analysis is in error 
because the willful infliction of the injury substantiating Count V was the means by which the 
failure to act alleged in Count IV was potentially harmful. But for Count V, there would be no 
allegation of Count IV and thus the injury the means by which'' Count IV occurred. 
This Court should vacate Sellers' conviction for Count IV or Count V and remand for 
resentencing. 
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IV V argues that trial court 
Sellers to Count IV as a . This in submitting to the jury and thereafter 
was not specifically preserved but may be 
Moad, 330 P.3d at 403. 
by this Court for fundamental error. 
In order to obtain relief on appeal, a defendant claiming fundamental error 
must demonstrate that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious 
without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
Id. In determining whether to apply the enhancement to Counts IV and V, the district court 
stated: 
I can't see a reasonable interpretation of count four, which is-yeah, count 
four, which is to fail to seek medical attention-I'm looking for the specific 
instruction so that the record is clear-that is Instruction 19, that is, "The 
defendant willfully caused the person's"-"the child's person or health to be 
injured by the act of failing to obtain medical attention." 
I don't see a causative relationship between failing to seek medical attention 
and causing subdural hemorrhages and/or bilateral retinal hemorrhages and/or 
bilateral retinoschisis. 
In other words, for the defendant to [be] guilty of the great bodily injury 
enhancement, in my view, there had to be a conviction on charges that 
produced that potential injury. And the failure to seek medical attention did not 
cause those three-any one of those three may have 
worse; I'll concede that. But I don't think they caused them. 
THI: 1646-47. By the trial court's own analysis, it determined that the '·circumstances or 
conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death" to support the in Part U 
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IV to 
or For reason, court Count IV as a 
misdemeanor or at least sentenced Sellers for Count IV as a misdemeanor instead of a felony. 
case should be remanded for resentencing on Count IV as a misdemeanor. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING SELLERS FOR MINIMUM FIXED 
TERMS INSTEAD OF THE MEDIAN RECOMMENDED SENTE>!CE OR PROBATION. 
sentence for Sellers convictions. This 
issue was preserved in Sellers' Rule 35(b) motion, R.478; and is reviewed by this Court for an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Burdett, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000). "To show an abuse 
discretion, the defendant must show that the sentence, light of the governing criteria, is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Stevens, 191 P.3d 217,226 (Idaho 
2008) ( citation omitted). Upon contention of an excessive sentence, this Court conducts an 
independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the 
offender, and the protection of public interest. See State v. Reinke, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1982). 
Sellers argues that the fixed term sentencing is unreasonable upon the facts of the case. 
See State v. Nice, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (Idaho 1982). In particular, Sellers challenged the fixed term 
an years the 
on such count as excessive. See RA 78-79. Further, Sellers argues that the fixed five-year terms 
on Count I, are 
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on 
were to abuse \Vas based on his belief that the preceding events on May 4, 2016 must 
been abuse. TH: The jury testimony heavily as they sent back 
question during initial deliberations asking, "Do \Ve look at each charge without considering 
what happened with any other charge? Or do we look at them at all as interrelated?" TUI: l 
The jury apparently ''answered their own question., the trial comi responded. TIil: 163 7. 
As noted by the State in 
involvement with the criminal justice 
case was first conviction, 
TIU: 1823. He has two other children with his ex-
wife and there have never been any concerns regarding child abuse. 1474-82. Sellers' 
friends, family, and community came forward in and contributed letters and petitions, 
attesting to Sellers' good character. THI: 1848-49; see also PSI, Letters. After evaluating the 
purposes of punishment, the trial court observed,"[ can't say that I've ever had a case where the 
sentencing determination was more difficult than the one that I am imposing today. This is a 
challenging circumstance." TIU: 1857. 
The typical median sentence in similarly situated offenders, as noted in the PSI and by 
the State, is "a median sentence of three years." TIIT: I upon that and the mitigating 
factors about, this Court should sentence to three (3) years for Counts l, IV, 
and V. 
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at any As a 
conviction for misdemeanor injury to a child based upon the jury's initial verdict on instructions 
and without an appropriate lesser-included jury verdict form, was error. 
Sellers was never actually convicted of the misdemeanor Count Ill and as such, his sentence is 
illegal and should be corrected. 
Finally, also as described above, Sellers' sentence for both Counts IV and V where those 
arose out a single criminal episode, violated due process law. Sellers' sentence 
should be corrected in this regard. 
V. THE MULTIPLE ERRORS IN JURY SELECTION VIOLATED SELLERS' RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW. 
The Idaho Constitution, article I, section 7, provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate." The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to 
the states via the Fourteen Amendment, provides that this jury be "impartial" in order to afford a 
criminal defendant due process of law. State v. Brooks, P.2d 99, l (Idaho App. 1982); 
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (l 97 l ). Indeed, "the Due Process Clause protects a defendant 
from jurors who are actually incapable of rendering an impartial verdict, based on the evidence 
and the law." Peters v. Kiff, 407 U 493, 50 I (1972). 
Sellers argues that he was not afforded due process based upon the trial court's failure to 
cause, and based State 
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her experiences with child abuse, equivocation regarding fairness and impartiality, and the 
fact that Juror 11 vvas her daughter. Further Juror 11 was victim of some of the abuse raised 
by Juror 10 in voir dire and both jurors actually sat on the . R.350; TI:347-48. This error was 
exacerbated by the district court's error in denying a cause challenge to Juror 20 who 
expressed bias in favor of the prosecutor and who the defense had to utilize a peremptory to 
remove from the panel, thus preventing utilizing that peremptory on Juror l 0. 
A. Juror 10 
During voir Juror IO responded affirmatively asked you or any close 
family member ever been the victim of a crime or conduct the same or similar to the offense or 
conduct the defendant has been charged with in this case?" TI: 167. In chambers, the following 
exchange took place: 
[Trial Court]: Okay. Juror Number 10 ... Is that right? 
[Juror 10]: Um-hum. 
[Trial Court]: You're the mother of the girl sitting next to you, I'm told. 
[Juror IO]: Yes. And the story's kind of about her. She was-when she was nine 
months old, she was abused by a baby-sitter. And we pressed charges. 
[Trial Court]: Okay. All right. What kind of abuse was that, if you don't mind 
just sharing. 
[Juror 10]: She her. 
[Trial Court]: Beat her? 
[Juror 10]: Yup. Um-hum. The whole side of her head was bruised. And it 
was-
[Trial Court]: 
was that? 
a How long ago 
a 
[Juror 10]: Yeah. 
Court]: The even had that in 
past, can you set that aside for purposes of deciding this case? Can you listen to 
the end and decide whether or not the defendant is guilty or not guilty based on 
that evidence that the State has the burden of proving him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt? Can you hold the State to that burden, and if they can't carry 
it find him not guilty? Can you do that? 
[Juror 10]: I could try. My stepson's also been abused by his stepdad, so-
[Trial Court]: So you've had two experiences? 
[Juror 1 O]: I've had it quite a bit. And we pressed charges on him too. 
[Trial Court]: Okay. Well-okay. And I understand that. And nobody has any 
problem with that. The question is deciding this case. 
[Juror 10]: This case. 
[Trial Court]: Where the defendant could be innocent, and you could decide that 
the State has not proved their-not carried their burden. And I need an assurance. 
I need more than, "I'll try." I need an assurance that that's what you believe-
[Juror 10]: I would listen to the evidence on it and-
[Trial Court]: And if you felt that he was not guilty, you could find him not 
guilty? 
[Juror 10]: Yeah. 
TI:175-77. Counsel for the State and Sellers asked follow-up questions regarding Juror lO's 
responses. Upon inquiry from Sellers' counsel: 
[Defense Counsel]: And when the judge was asking you if you could wait till 
the end of evidence and make a decision, you said yeah, you could, but. And 
then I never heard the rest of that thought. 
[Juror 1 O]: Well, it's just an iffy subject. So I want to be honest. 
[Defense Counsel]: How would you have completed that sentence? 
[Juror 10]: Well, I would listen to the evidence, and-I'd listen to the evidence. 
[Defense Counsel]: Did you have a thought that would follow that? I'd listen to 
that evidence, but you don't know how fair you could be? 
[Juror IO]: I don't know. Because where I've been through it, I-you know, 
I-how would T put it? I would think I'd want to be honest with it and listen to 
everything. But you-you know, you don't know where you've been through 
that stuff. 
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you want you on 
want me. To be 
TI: 179-80. The State went on to attempt to rehabilitate 
want me. 
10 again: 
[Special Prosecutor]: But what we want to make sure is that you could listen to the 
evidence and make a decision, and if the State doesn't meet burden of proof, that 
could you find him not guilty. Could you do that? 
[Juror 1 O]: Yeah. I could do that. 
TI: 180. Sellers' counsel challenged Juror 10 for cause due to experiences with child abuse 
and "she went back and forth" on her ability to fair. TI:208-09. The trial court denied for 
cause challenge, stating: 
[I]t was a little back and forth. I'm not going to disagree with you on that, 
[ defense counsel]. But in the final analysis we have to take people at their word 
with when they say they can be fair and impartial. She said she could. And I 
have no--T don't really have a reason to, at this point, to say she cannot do that. 
TI:210. But, the trial court also went on to express he was "troubled by the fact that we have a 
mother and daughter sitting on the jury. I don't like that." TI:210. The court and counsel also did 
not pull in Juror 11 to inquire about her feelings regarding previously having been a victim of 
child abuse. 
"A juror lacks impartiality if actual or implied bias exists, and the Idaho Code provides 
criminal defendants with the right to strike a biased juror for cause.'· State v. Abdullah, 348 P.3d 
I, 36 (Idaho 2015) (citing Idaho Code §§ 19-2017, -2019, -2020). When a juror, such as Juror 10, 
"admits bias and gives no unequivocal assurance of the ability to be impartial despite several 
efforts by the court or to elicit such an assurance, the juror should disqualified for 
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(I 
It was an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the for cause challenge to Juror 
l O as court acknowledged not only that she was "back and forth" but also had concerns 
regarding the fact that Juror 11 was her daughter-not to mention the victim of some of the 
abuse Juror IO referenced in chambers. This issue is not moot because Juror 10 actually sat on 
jury, as described below, Sellers for cause challenge to another juror was also improperly 
thus requiring defense counsel to use a peremptory to remove him from the jury. 
B. Juror 20 
Juror 20 responded affirmatively when the jury panel was asked if anyone knew the 
county prosecutor. TI: 154. The following exchange regarding this relationship took place in the 
presence of the rest of the panel: 
[Trial Court]: Okay. Tell me your relationship with Mr. Peterson, then. 
[Juror 20]: Well, l know Mr. Peterson, and I trust his judgment. And I don't know if that 
would bias anything or not. 
[Trial Court]: Well, that's the question. Are you going to be able to-whether you trust 
him or like him is irrelevant to me, frankly. The question is, do you-are you going to 
listen to the evidence in this case and decide the case based on the evidence, regardless of 
[the] fact that Mr. Peterson is one of the attorneys in the case? 
[Juror 20]: Yeah. I could do that. 
[Trial Court]: Could you do that? 
[Juror 20]: Yeah. 
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if 
serve 
18-19. 
In chambers, Juror 20 inquired if Sellers' Amanda Baret Sellers was "George and 
daughter" because to rent to them had some "Tl:222. The parties 
did not know. Id. Juror 20 was also concerned about his ability to '·stomach" the child abuse 
issues given his experience working -with children in his "church assignment" Id. The trial court 
inquired, "all I'm asking is whether or not you can listen to the evidence, be fair and impartial, 
and decide that question." TI:223. Juror 20 responded, "Well, I think I could.'' Juror 20 was 
also a farmer and concerned with the fact that the trial was occurring in the midst of the harvest: 
''And then I don't know, we farmers, sitting here. I don't know if we'd be antsy sitting here. I 
want to this thing done. I hope-I don't think I would, but-" Id. 
Defense counsel took the opportunity in chambers to question Juror 20 further: 
[Defense Counsel]: I've got some questions for Mr. Funk while he's here. 
It might be easier to ask in here. 
[Trial Court]: Yeah. Okay, sure. 
[Defense Counsel]: So you are employed at Funk Farms? 
[Juror 20]: I own Bill Funk Farms. 
[Defense Counsel]: You own Funk Farms? 
[Juror 20]: Yes. 
[Defense Counsel]: Have you or any of your immediate family 
contributed to [the county attorney's] political campaign? 
[Juror 20]: I have. 
[Defense Counsel]: And was your daughter involved in a criminal case 
that [the county attorney]-
[Juror 20]: Yes. 
[Defense Counsel]· you 
[Juror 20]: Yes. 
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[Defense Counsel]: Were some felony charges reduced to 
misdemeanors? 
[Juror 20]: You know, I don't remember if they were felonies. I don't 
understand all that. 
[Defense Counsel]: But you're very pleased ,vith his representation-
[Juror 20]: I am. 
[Defense Counsel]: --and how that resolved in that case. 
[Juror 20]: I am. Yes. 
TI:223-25. Defense counsel motioned court to dismiss Juror 20 for cause. TI:251 R.349. 
Sellers' motion for cause to dismiss Juror 20 was denied after the State objected. TI:252-53. 
Defense counsel renewed his for cause challenge later: 
[Defense Counsel]: I would like to renew a motion for cause related to 
Mr.-to Juror Number 20. 
[Trial Court]: Okay. 
[Defense Counsel]: And I-we just discussed his relationship with the 
prosecutor and my sense is that he-he-I mean I know everyone in 
town knows [the detective] everyone in town knows [the county 
prosecutor]. My sense is that he-his business relationships and political 
relationships go beyond just knowing who the prosecutor is, and so I 
would ask that he be struck for cause at this point. 
[Trial Court]: [Juror 20], let me ask you a question. Please stand, if you 
would sir. The question is can you serve as a fair and impartial juror in 
this case, listening to all the evidence dispassionately and making an 
informed decision without regard to any kind of contact or association 
you've ever had with [the county attorney]? 
[Juror 20]: I think so. 
[Trial Court]: You don't think there would be any problem with that? 
You're not going to favor the state's case because you have some kind of 
political or other association with [the county prosecutor]. Is that true? 
[Juror 20]: No, I wouldn't favor him because of that 
[Trial Court]: All right. Would you favor it for any reason? 
[Juror 20]: No. 
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Post-trial, Sellers' defense additional clarifying regarding Juror 
20's relationship \Vith the Power County prosecutor. See THI: 1730-44. In fact, the 
involved the county prosecutor, but the prosecutor had indeed been involved in 
investigating Juror 20's daughter in another case. THI: 1730-35. This issue was raised before the 
trial court by Sellers as a basis for the court granting him a new trial and was subject to post-trial 
proceedings including a discovery request and conference with the trial court. R.359-60, 420-22; 
TIII:1730. 
The prosecutor argued in response that the of Juror 20's bias was "moot" because 
Juror 20 "wasn't actually on the jury'' and "because [defense counsel] didn't challenge any other 
jury member, anyone that actually made it into the panel." THI: 1737. As noted above, this 
assertion is incorrect as a challenged juror did in fact make it on the jury. See State v. Ramos, 808 
1313, 1314-15 (Idaho 1991) (where a peremptory is 
remaining jurors was biased against him). 
defendant must show one of 
As a result of the failure to strike these biased jurors for cause, the jury empaneled was 
not impartial and this case should be a new trial 
VI. SELLERS SHOULD RECEIVE A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS DOCTRINE. 
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the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right 
to process. V. 965 P.2d l 183 (Idaho 1998) ( quotations omitted). 
Sellers has described several errors above. In particular, the trial court erred in permitting 
both Counts IV and V to be tried and sentenced; the trial court erred during jury selection in 
denying for cause challenges that resulted in a biased juror being seated; the trial court erred both 
in initially instructing the jury, and in the manner the trial court attempted to correct the 
instructional errors; the trial court erred in entering a misdemeanor conviction where no 
misdemeanor conviction was ever found by the jury. These errors combined, denied Sellers' his 
constitutional right to due process, warranting a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Sellers makes several claims of error in trial proceedings that either warrant vacating one 
or more of his convictions, remanding for a new trial, and/or resentencing. Sellers asks this Court 
to provide the remedy appropriate to the substantial errors. 
Dated this 101h day of February, 2016 
Dar verson 
Counsel for Appellant 
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